Introducción
Este argumento se originó a partir de dos eventos de entendimiento de mi parte.
El primer evento ocurrió en septiembre de 2014, cuando entendí que la principal de las cinco vías por las que S. Tomás de Aquino demuestra la existencia de Dios, el argumento de contingencia, presupone que la realidad es racionalmente explicable hasta su última instancia, presuposición que en metafísica tiene un nombre: "Principle of Sufficient Reason" (PSR). Ese entendimiento fue explícitamente confirmado al poco tiempo por el filósofo tomista Edward Feser, en un artículo que publicó en su blog el 2 de noviembre de 2014:
"Now if PSR is false, then the principle of causality is threatened as well, since if things are ultimately unintelligible, there is no reason to think that a potency might not be actualized even though there is nothing actual to actualize it and thus that something contingent, like the universe, might just be without any cause at all. But then it would not be possible to argue from the world to God as cause of the world."
El segundo evento ocurrió en agosto de 2015, cuando entendí que el PSR equivale al teísmo o lo presupone. Esto lo presenté como "thesis 1" en el artículo “Thesis 1: holding the PSR is equivalent to, or presupposes, holding theism”.
Por lo tanto las cinco vías no demuestran realmente la existencia de Dios, porque presuponen lo que quieren demostrar. (En realidad, dado que parten de la presuposición de un teísmo difuso, demuestran estrictamente que, si la realidad es racionalmente explicable hasta su última instancia, esa última instancia es el Dios inmutable del teísmo clásico que creó el universo de la nada, y no la divinidad del panenteísmo, de cuya sustancia habría emanado el universo, o por lo menos las almas.)
Hechos comprobados y disyuntiva
En definitiva, ante los siguientes hechos (facts) comprobados:
F1: el universo existe y, como un todo, es una entidad contingente: podría ser distinto, podría no existir. Más aún:
F2: el universo comenzó a existir hace 13.800 millones de años, y no hay una teoría científica sólida que ofrezca una causa física de ese comienzo. Hay solamente conjeturas no verificables como el multiverso. (Por otro lado, un universo cíclico que se expande hasta un máximo, luego se contrae hasta un mínimo, y así sucesivamente, es una alternativa positivamente invalidada por las observaciones acumuladas desde 1998 que demuestran concluyentemente que la expansión del universo se está acelerando y por lo tanto va a continuar indefinidamente.)
F3: el universo funciona causalmente y de acuerdo a leyes expresables matemáticamente.
F4: las constantes físicas del universo exhiben una sintonía fina que lo hace adecuado para el desarrollo de organismos vivientes complejos.
F5: la mente humana razona en base a causalidad y es capaz de crear sistemas formales matemáticos, incluyendo obviamente los que expresan las leyes que describen el funcionamiento del universo.
cada ser humano puede adoptar una de dos posiciones posibles, la primera de las cuales explica racionalmente los hechos y la otra simplemente los acepta como "brute facts":
Posición SR (Spiritual-Rational)
Existe en última instancia una Realidad Subsistente que es Espíritu y Razón (Logos), que creó el universo (explica F1 y F2) conforme a esa Razón (explica F3) con el fin de albergar el desarrollo de criaturas racionales (explica F4), cuya razón es creada a imagen de la Razón increada (explica F5).
Posición ME (Materialist-Evolutionist)
F1 ... F3: “brute fact”, “that’s just the way it is”. “Es así”, y esperar o demandar que tenga explicación es una presuposición a priori totalmente injustificada. (Ver las posiciones de David Hume, Bertrand Russell y Sean Carroll en el artículo anterior.)
F4: la sintonía fina puede deberse a que hay muchísimos universos, en cuyo caso es obvio que solamente en aquellos universos con parámetros aptos para el desarrollo de la vida puede desarrollarse la vida. O tal vez no haya muchos universos, y simplemente, al igual que con F1 ... F3, “that’s just the way it is.”
F5: la capacidad de la mente humana fue resultado de la evolución: el cerebro alcanzó una complejidad suficiente para permitir el pensamiento abstracto, sin que intervenga ningun alma espiritual. En cuanto a la causalidad, el mono que pensó que la rama se movió sin causa fue comido por un león.
Comparación de las posiciones
Las posiciones son totalmente opuestas en dos aspectos: explicación y sentido, tanto del universo como, mucho más importante, de la vida humana.
En la posición SR el universo tiene explicación y la vida humana tiene sentido, perdurando luego de la muerte.
En la posición ME el universo no tiene explicación y la vida humana no tiene sentido, terminando en la muerte. Ni siquiera tiene sentido la humanidad en su conjunto, porque es bien sabido que a lo sumo en 2.000 millones de años el sol habrá calcinado la tierra.
Conclusión
Expresaré la conclusión citando dos discursos de Benedicto XVI, no como argumento de autoridad sino porque hago míos esos párrafos. En primer lugar resumo la situación citando de:
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/es/speeches/2006/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060406_xxi-wyd.html
Por último, para llegar a la cuestión definitiva, yo diría: Dios o existe o no existe. Hay sólo dos opciones. O se reconoce la prioridad de la razón, de la Razón creadora que está en el origen de todo y es el principio de todo -la prioridad de la razón es también prioridad de la libertad- o se sostiene la prioridad de lo irracional, por lo cual todo lo que funciona en nuestra tierra y en nuestra vida sería sólo ocasional, marginal, un producto irracional; la razón sería un producto de la irracionalidad. En definitiva, no se puede "probar" uno u otro proyecto, pero la gran opción del cristianismo es la opción por la racionalidad y por la prioridad de la razón. Esta opción me parece la mejor, pues nos demuestra que detrás de todo hay una gran Inteligencia, de la que nos podemos fiar.
Pero a mí me parece que el verdadero problema actual contra la fe es el mal en el mundo: nos preguntamos cómo es compatible el mal con esta racionalidad del Creador. Y aquí realmente necesitamos al Dios que se encarnó y que nos muestra que él no sólo es una razón matemática, sino que esta razón originaria es también Amor. Si analizamos las grandes opciones, la opción cristiana es también hoy la más racional y la más humana. Por eso, podemos elaborar con confianza una filosofía, una visión del mundo basada en esta prioridad de la razón, en esta confianza en que la Razón creadora es Amor, y que este amor es Dios.
Luego amplío la descripción de la opción por la racionalidad citando de:
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/es/speeches/2007/july/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20070724_clero-cadore.html
Pero la doctrina de la evolución no responde a todos los interrogantes y sobre todo no responde al gran interrogante filosófico: ¿de dónde viene todo esto y cómo todo toma un camino que desemboca finalmente en el hombre? Eso me parece muy importante. En mi lección de Ratisbona quise decir también que la razón debe abrirse más: ciertamente debe ver esos datos, pero también debe ver que no bastan para explicar toda la realidad. Nuestra razón ve más ampliamente. En el fondo no es algo irracional, un producto de la irracionalidad; hay una razón anterior a todo, la Razón creadora, y en realidad nosotros somos un reflejo de la Razón creadora. Somos pensados y queridos; por tanto, hay una idea que nos precede, un sentido que nos precede y que debemos descubrir y seguir, y que en definitiva da significado a nuestra vida.
Así pues, el primer punto es: descubrir que realmente nuestro ser es razonable, ha sido pensado, tiene un sentido; y nuestra gran misión es descubrir ese sentido, vivirlo y dar así un nuevo elemento a la gran armonía cósmica pensada por el Creador. Si es así, entonces los elementos de dificultad se transforman en momentos de madurez, de proceso y de progreso de nuestro ser, que tiene sentido desde su concepción hasta su último momento de vida.
Material adicional sobre la opción por la Razón creadora
Blanco Sarto, P. (2006). "Logos. Joseph Ratzinger y la historia de una palabra". Límite. Revista de Filosofía y Psicología, 1 (14), 57-86
http://dadun.unav.edu/handle/10171/36503
http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=83601403
Benedicto XVI (2006). Discurso en la Universidad de Ratisbona (Regensburg)
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/es/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html
11 August 2015
05 August 2015
Thesis 1: holding the PSR is equivalent to, or presupposes, holding theism
It is well established that holding the PSR is a requirement for the classical arguments for the existence of God [1]. I hereby propose the thesis that holding the PSR is equivalent to, or presupposes, holding theism. Not necessarily full-fledged classical theism, but at least a basic, less clear-cut version thereof.
Thesis 1: holding the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), which states that “there is a sufficient reason or adequate necessary objective explanation for the being of whatever is and for all attributes of any being” [2], or alternatively that "for every fact F, there must be an explanation why F is the case" [3], either is equivalent to holding the following two notions, or presupposes holding them:
R1. Subsistent, Ultimate Reality is logos, i.e. reason. [4]
R2. Human reason is created in the image of the uncreated Logos.
Of course, the two notions above are held in conjunction with this:
R3. Created reality was created according to reason. [5]
which is clearly consistent with the observable fact that the universe works causally according to mathematically expressible laws.
A panentheist can hold these notions by replacing "created" with "created/emanated" in R2 and R3. I mention this possibility to allow for panentheism as alternative "bootstrap" position or entry point, which could then, by reasoning on the PSR, be corrected into classical theism. Which makes sense considering the numbers of Taoists, Mahayana Buddhists, Hinduists and Sikhs.
Noting that Prof. Feser stated that "to see the world as intelligible or rational through and through is implicitly to be a (classical) theist" [6], the basis for a possible demonstration of Thesis 1 is: why else should we assume that reality is ultimately rational? This can be perceived more clearly if we examine the alternative interpretation of observed facts that a materialistic evolutionist could propose instead of that based on the PSR, either in its traditional form or in the form of the Rx above (which is equivalent to the traditional form if this thesis is correct):
M1. Brute fact: the universe exists and works causally according to laws expressed mathematically.
M2. The rationality of our mind, i.e. the agreement between the way it works and the way the universe works, was selected by evolution. Because, on seeing the branches of a bush moving in windless weather:
- the walking-talking apes who thought the movement had a cause got ready to fight or flee, survived, and passed on their genes.
- the walking-talking apes who thought the movement did not have a cause did nothing, and were killed by a rival tribe or an animal.
M3. At some point, some of the walking-talking apes that were so evolutionary successful because, among other things, the way their mind worked conformed to the way the universe worked, got the big picture the other way round, and thought that it was the way the universe worked which conformed to the way their mind worked. That would have had no practical consequence, but some of them went even further, and claimed that their mind was able to explain reliably not only the way the universe worked, but even why there was a universe! And the apes called that statement the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and they rejoyced greatly.
"Hey, walking-talking ape, who do you think you are?"
---
This thesis originated from my realization on Sep. 2014 that the modal cosmological argument, or argument from contingency, is just the principle of efficient causality (PC), and that the PC in turn is based on just the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the latter statement being confirmed by Prof. Feser on Nov. 02, 2014 [1]. Thus, the teaching in First Vatican Council's Constitution "Dei Filius" "that God, the source and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural light of human reason "for his invisible attributes, ever since the creation of the world, have been clearly perceived, being understood through the things that have been made."" (ch. 2 "On Revelation", which in turn quotes (Rom 1:20)) presupposes the implicit condition "if the person in question assumes that reality is ultimately intelligible/explainable by human reason".
Now, whereas philosophy is about the rational explanation of reality, the assumption that reality is ultimately rationally explainable is meta-philosophical, i.e. holding the PSR is a meta-philosophical choice. Thus, the issue of theism vs atheism is not really philosophical but meta-philosophical, as the latter position is based on the assumption that reality is not ultimately rationally intelligible/explainable. Which is exactly David Hume's position as summarized by Texas A&M University Prof. of Philosophy Stephen H. Daniel [7]:
"The argument assumes that the world's existence can be explained rationally by appeal to God as its cause; but why should we think that the world's existence is rationally explainable?"
Or Bertrand Russell's position in his famous debate with Fr. F. C. Copleston [8]:
"R: The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever.
R: what I'm saying is that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total.
R: I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.
R: for my part, I do think the notion of the world having an explanation is a mistake. I don't see why one should expect it to have,
C: But your general point then, Lord Russell, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?
R: Yes, that's my position."
Or Prof. Sean Carroll's position, as stated in 2007 [9]:
"There is a chain of explanations concerning things that happen in the universe, which ultimately reaches to the fundamental laws of nature and stops. ... There is a strong temptation to approach the universe with a demand that it make sense of itself and of our lives, rather than simply accepting it for what it is."
and again in 2012 [10]:
"It’s okay to admit that a chain of explanations might end somewhere, and that somewhere might be with the universe and the laws it obeys, and the only further explanation might be “that’s just the way it is.” ... I could be wrong about that, but an insistence that “the universe must explain itself” or some such thing seems like a completely unsupportable a priori assumption."
References
[1] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/voluntarism-and-psr.html
"Now if PSR is false, then the principle of causality is threatened as well, since if things are ultimately unintelligible, there is no reason to think that a potency might not be actualized even though there is nothing actual to actualize it and thus that something contingent, like the universe, might just be without any cause at all. But then it would not be possible to argue from the world to God as cause of the world."
[2] Bernard Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, p. 15.
[3] Melamed, Yitzhak and Lin, Martin, "Principle of Sufficient Reason", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/sufficient-reason/
[4] In "Subsistent, Ultimate Reality is logos", "logos" is meant as divine attribute common to the three divine Persons, not the Logos as divine Person, the Son. Just as in "God is love" (1 Jn 4:8,16), "love" is meant as divine attribute common to the three divine Persons, not Love as divine Person, the Holy Spirit.
[5] In line with "All things came into being through Him" (Jn 1:3) and "in Him all things were created" (Col 1:16), where "Him" is the Logos as divine Person, the Son.
[6] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/10/could-theist-deny-psr.html
[7] Test Questions for Phil 251: Intro. to Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, option 101.B
(where options 99 and 101 should say "cosmological", not "teleological", argument).
http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/quesrel.html
[8] http://www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/cosmological_radio.htm
[9] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2007/11/25/turtles-much-of-the-way-down/
[10] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2012/04/28/a-universe-from-nothing/
Thesis 1: holding the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), which states that “there is a sufficient reason or adequate necessary objective explanation for the being of whatever is and for all attributes of any being” [2], or alternatively that "for every fact F, there must be an explanation why F is the case" [3], either is equivalent to holding the following two notions, or presupposes holding them:
R1. Subsistent, Ultimate Reality is logos, i.e. reason. [4]
R2. Human reason is created in the image of the uncreated Logos.
Of course, the two notions above are held in conjunction with this:
R3. Created reality was created according to reason. [5]
which is clearly consistent with the observable fact that the universe works causally according to mathematically expressible laws.
A panentheist can hold these notions by replacing "created" with "created/emanated" in R2 and R3. I mention this possibility to allow for panentheism as alternative "bootstrap" position or entry point, which could then, by reasoning on the PSR, be corrected into classical theism. Which makes sense considering the numbers of Taoists, Mahayana Buddhists, Hinduists and Sikhs.
Noting that Prof. Feser stated that "to see the world as intelligible or rational through and through is implicitly to be a (classical) theist" [6], the basis for a possible demonstration of Thesis 1 is: why else should we assume that reality is ultimately rational? This can be perceived more clearly if we examine the alternative interpretation of observed facts that a materialistic evolutionist could propose instead of that based on the PSR, either in its traditional form or in the form of the Rx above (which is equivalent to the traditional form if this thesis is correct):
M1. Brute fact: the universe exists and works causally according to laws expressed mathematically.
M2. The rationality of our mind, i.e. the agreement between the way it works and the way the universe works, was selected by evolution. Because, on seeing the branches of a bush moving in windless weather:
- the walking-talking apes who thought the movement had a cause got ready to fight or flee, survived, and passed on their genes.
- the walking-talking apes who thought the movement did not have a cause did nothing, and were killed by a rival tribe or an animal.
M3. At some point, some of the walking-talking apes that were so evolutionary successful because, among other things, the way their mind worked conformed to the way the universe worked, got the big picture the other way round, and thought that it was the way the universe worked which conformed to the way their mind worked. That would have had no practical consequence, but some of them went even further, and claimed that their mind was able to explain reliably not only the way the universe worked, but even why there was a universe! And the apes called that statement the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and they rejoyced greatly.
"Hey, walking-talking ape, who do you think you are?"
---
This thesis originated from my realization on Sep. 2014 that the modal cosmological argument, or argument from contingency, is just the principle of efficient causality (PC), and that the PC in turn is based on just the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the latter statement being confirmed by Prof. Feser on Nov. 02, 2014 [1]. Thus, the teaching in First Vatican Council's Constitution "Dei Filius" "that God, the source and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural light of human reason "for his invisible attributes, ever since the creation of the world, have been clearly perceived, being understood through the things that have been made."" (ch. 2 "On Revelation", which in turn quotes (Rom 1:20)) presupposes the implicit condition "if the person in question assumes that reality is ultimately intelligible/explainable by human reason".
Now, whereas philosophy is about the rational explanation of reality, the assumption that reality is ultimately rationally explainable is meta-philosophical, i.e. holding the PSR is a meta-philosophical choice. Thus, the issue of theism vs atheism is not really philosophical but meta-philosophical, as the latter position is based on the assumption that reality is not ultimately rationally intelligible/explainable. Which is exactly David Hume's position as summarized by Texas A&M University Prof. of Philosophy Stephen H. Daniel [7]:
"The argument assumes that the world's existence can be explained rationally by appeal to God as its cause; but why should we think that the world's existence is rationally explainable?"
Or Bertrand Russell's position in his famous debate with Fr. F. C. Copleston [8]:
"R: The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever.
R: what I'm saying is that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total.
R: I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.
R: for my part, I do think the notion of the world having an explanation is a mistake. I don't see why one should expect it to have,
C: But your general point then, Lord Russell, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?
R: Yes, that's my position."
Or Prof. Sean Carroll's position, as stated in 2007 [9]:
"There is a chain of explanations concerning things that happen in the universe, which ultimately reaches to the fundamental laws of nature and stops. ... There is a strong temptation to approach the universe with a demand that it make sense of itself and of our lives, rather than simply accepting it for what it is."
and again in 2012 [10]:
"It’s okay to admit that a chain of explanations might end somewhere, and that somewhere might be with the universe and the laws it obeys, and the only further explanation might be “that’s just the way it is.” ... I could be wrong about that, but an insistence that “the universe must explain itself” or some such thing seems like a completely unsupportable a priori assumption."
References
[1] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/voluntarism-and-psr.html
"Now if PSR is false, then the principle of causality is threatened as well, since if things are ultimately unintelligible, there is no reason to think that a potency might not be actualized even though there is nothing actual to actualize it and thus that something contingent, like the universe, might just be without any cause at all. But then it would not be possible to argue from the world to God as cause of the world."
[2] Bernard Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, p. 15.
[3] Melamed, Yitzhak and Lin, Martin, "Principle of Sufficient Reason", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/sufficient-reason/
[4] In "Subsistent, Ultimate Reality is logos", "logos" is meant as divine attribute common to the three divine Persons, not the Logos as divine Person, the Son. Just as in "God is love" (1 Jn 4:8,16), "love" is meant as divine attribute common to the three divine Persons, not Love as divine Person, the Holy Spirit.
[5] In line with "All things came into being through Him" (Jn 1:3) and "in Him all things were created" (Col 1:16), where "Him" is the Logos as divine Person, the Son.
[6] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/10/could-theist-deny-psr.html
[7] Test Questions for Phil 251: Intro. to Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, option 101.B
(where options 99 and 101 should say "cosmological", not "teleological", argument).
http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/quesrel.html
[8] http://www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/cosmological_radio.htm
[9] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2007/11/25/turtles-much-of-the-way-down/
[10] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2012/04/28/a-universe-from-nothing/
Argument from contingency is Principle of Causality and requires PSR and just PSR
In http://www.thesumma.info/one/one29.php , Fr Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (GL) writes about the principle of causality, or more precisely the principle of efficient causality:
As a matter of fact, this principle is commonly formulated not only in the phenomenal but also in the ontological order, and not only does it state that "every phenomenon supposes an antecedent phenomenon," but it also says: "Everything that comes into being has a cause"; or rather, to express it more universally, every contingent being is efficiently caused by another. Even if de facto this contingent being eternally existed, it would still need a productive and conservative cause, because a contingent being is not its own reason for existence.
Comparing it with the modal cosmological argument, or argument from contingency, as stated by Prof. Edward Feser in:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/so-you-think-you-understand.html
What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause, or that what is contingent has a cause.
it is clear that the modal cosmological argument as stated by Prof. Feser is identical to the principle of efficient causality as stated by Fr GL. This is confirmed by another text from Fr GL at:
http://www.thesumma.info/reality/reality5.php
The principle of efficient causality also finds its formula as a function of being. Wrong is the formula: "Every phenomenon presupposes an antecedent phenomenon." The right formula runs thus: "Every contingent being, even if it exists without beginning, [137] needs an efficient cause and, in last analysis, an uncreated cause."
Back to the first link from Fr GL, he attempts to show that "one cannot deny the principle of causality without denying the principle of contradiction."
First he argues that "uncaused contingent being is repugnant to reason. In other words, nothing is what results from nothing, without a cause nothing comes into being." However, the second statement, while obviously true, does not prove the first, because an uncaused contingent being does not NEED to have "come into being", it could just have always existed. (To accommodate current science, that would be a hypothetical "metaverse" undergoing eternal inflation, in which "pocket universes" such as ours would pop up here and there.) That would mean that such a being would be a brute fact and not explainable by reason, which is not the same as "repugnant to reason". In other words, that possibility would be against the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) but not against the principle of (non-)contradiction (PNC) as Fr GL argues.
Fr GL repeats his argument in the same paragraph:
Why is an uncaused contingent being repugnant to reason? It is because a contingent being is that which can either exist or not exist (this being its definition). Therefore it is not self-existent, and must be dependent upon another for this; otherwise, if it were neither self-existent nor dependent upon another for existence, it would have no reason for existing, and so would be the same as nothing. "Nothing is what results from nothing." To say that from nothing, or that from no cause either efficient or material, something comes into being, is a contradiction.
IMV, there are three non-sequiturs in this paragraph.
First, that a being "can either exist or not exist" means that it does not have in itself the reason for its existence. However, that does not imply that "it is not self-existent", but rather that "it is not self-existent IF reality is rationally explainable". Therefore, a contingent being can be either a self-existent brute fact, if reality is not rationally intelligible, or dependent upon another for its existence, if reality is rationally intelligible.
Second, Fr GL is right when he says that if a contingent being "were neither (rationally intelligibly, I add) self-existent nor dependent upon another for existence, it would have no reason for existing". However, that does not entail that such a contingent being "would be the same as nothing". Because to "have no reason for existing", to be a brute fact, is not the same as to "be the same as nothing". Not being rationally explainable is not the same as not being.
Third, Fr GL is right when he says that: ""Nothing is what results from nothing." To say that from nothing, or that from no cause either efficient or material, something comes into being, is a contradiction." However, a contingent universe (or metaverse) could just have always existed without having ever come into being, so that its existence, while being a brute fact and as such against the PSR, would not imply a contradiction.
Summarizing, then, a contingent being is that which can either exist or not exist (by definition), so that, when referring to the universe (or metaverse), there are three posibilities:
a. it is dependent upon the Subsistent Being for its existence, (in which case both the PNC and the PSR hold),
b. it exists by itself, and has always existed, as a non-rationally intelligible brute fact, (in which case the PNC holds but the PSR does not),
c. it has come into being from nothing, as a brute fact repugnant to reason, (in which case neither the PNC nor the PSR holds).
From this, two conclusions:
First, as the modal cosmological argument, or argument from contingency, is just the principle of efficient causality, it is based on just the PSR [1] and does not require the aristotelical framework of act and potency. This is an important result, because otherwise St Paul's statement that "since the creation of the world God's invisible attributes, his eternal power and divine nature, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made" (Rom 1:20) would need to be restated as "since Aristotle wrote his Metaphysics God's invisible attributes, his eternal power and divine nature, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made".
Second, it seems that the teaching in First Vatican Council's Constitution Dei Filius "that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things;" as well as the above Pauline statement that Dei Filius quotes right next as basis for that teaching, presupposes the implicit condition "if the person in question assumes that reality is ultimately intelligible/explainable by human reason". [2]
Thus, the issue of theism vs atheism (agnosticism) would not be really philosophical but meta-philosophical, as the latter positions would be based on the assumption that reality as a whole is not (necessarily) rationally intelligible/explainable.
Which is exactly David Hume's position as summarized by Texas A&M University Prof. of Philosophy Stephen H. Daniel [3]:
"The argument assumes that the world's existence can be explained rationally by appeal to God as its cause; but why should we think that the world's existence is rationally explainable?"
And which is the basis of the "Thesis 1" that I propose on the next article.
References
[1] That PSR is sufficient for PC was confirmed by Prof. Edward Feser in an article he published in his blog on 2014 09 06:
a Scholastic might (as some Neo-Scholastic writers did) argue for PC on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
[I]f PC were false — if the actualization of a potency, the existence of a contingent thing, or something’s changing or coming into being could lack a cause — then these phenomena would not be intelligible, would lack a sufficient reason or adequate explanation. Hence if PSR is true, PC must be true.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/09/marmodoro-on-psr-and-pc.html
[2] That PSR is necessary for PC was confirmed by Prof. Edward Feser in an article he published in his blog on 2014 11 02:
"Now if PSR is false, then the principle of causality is threatened as well, since if things are ultimately unintelligible, there is no reason to think that a potency might not be actualized even though there is nothing actual to actualize it and thus that something contingent, like the universe, might just be without any cause at all. But then it would not be possible to argue from the world to God as cause of the world."
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/voluntarism-and-psr.html
[3] Test Questions for Phil 251: Intro. to Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, option 101.B
(where options 99 and 101 should say "cosmological", not "teleological", argument).
http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/quesrel.html
As a matter of fact, this principle is commonly formulated not only in the phenomenal but also in the ontological order, and not only does it state that "every phenomenon supposes an antecedent phenomenon," but it also says: "Everything that comes into being has a cause"; or rather, to express it more universally, every contingent being is efficiently caused by another. Even if de facto this contingent being eternally existed, it would still need a productive and conservative cause, because a contingent being is not its own reason for existence.
Comparing it with the modal cosmological argument, or argument from contingency, as stated by Prof. Edward Feser in:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/so-you-think-you-understand.html
What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause, or that what is contingent has a cause.
it is clear that the modal cosmological argument as stated by Prof. Feser is identical to the principle of efficient causality as stated by Fr GL. This is confirmed by another text from Fr GL at:
http://www.thesumma.info/reality/reality5.php
The principle of efficient causality also finds its formula as a function of being. Wrong is the formula: "Every phenomenon presupposes an antecedent phenomenon." The right formula runs thus: "Every contingent being, even if it exists without beginning, [137] needs an efficient cause and, in last analysis, an uncreated cause."
Back to the first link from Fr GL, he attempts to show that "one cannot deny the principle of causality without denying the principle of contradiction."
First he argues that "uncaused contingent being is repugnant to reason. In other words, nothing is what results from nothing, without a cause nothing comes into being." However, the second statement, while obviously true, does not prove the first, because an uncaused contingent being does not NEED to have "come into being", it could just have always existed. (To accommodate current science, that would be a hypothetical "metaverse" undergoing eternal inflation, in which "pocket universes" such as ours would pop up here and there.) That would mean that such a being would be a brute fact and not explainable by reason, which is not the same as "repugnant to reason". In other words, that possibility would be against the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) but not against the principle of (non-)contradiction (PNC) as Fr GL argues.
Fr GL repeats his argument in the same paragraph:
Why is an uncaused contingent being repugnant to reason? It is because a contingent being is that which can either exist or not exist (this being its definition). Therefore it is not self-existent, and must be dependent upon another for this; otherwise, if it were neither self-existent nor dependent upon another for existence, it would have no reason for existing, and so would be the same as nothing. "Nothing is what results from nothing." To say that from nothing, or that from no cause either efficient or material, something comes into being, is a contradiction.
IMV, there are three non-sequiturs in this paragraph.
First, that a being "can either exist or not exist" means that it does not have in itself the reason for its existence. However, that does not imply that "it is not self-existent", but rather that "it is not self-existent IF reality is rationally explainable". Therefore, a contingent being can be either a self-existent brute fact, if reality is not rationally intelligible, or dependent upon another for its existence, if reality is rationally intelligible.
Second, Fr GL is right when he says that if a contingent being "were neither (rationally intelligibly, I add) self-existent nor dependent upon another for existence, it would have no reason for existing". However, that does not entail that such a contingent being "would be the same as nothing". Because to "have no reason for existing", to be a brute fact, is not the same as to "be the same as nothing". Not being rationally explainable is not the same as not being.
Third, Fr GL is right when he says that: ""Nothing is what results from nothing." To say that from nothing, or that from no cause either efficient or material, something comes into being, is a contradiction." However, a contingent universe (or metaverse) could just have always existed without having ever come into being, so that its existence, while being a brute fact and as such against the PSR, would not imply a contradiction.
Summarizing, then, a contingent being is that which can either exist or not exist (by definition), so that, when referring to the universe (or metaverse), there are three posibilities:
a. it is dependent upon the Subsistent Being for its existence, (in which case both the PNC and the PSR hold),
b. it exists by itself, and has always existed, as a non-rationally intelligible brute fact, (in which case the PNC holds but the PSR does not),
c. it has come into being from nothing, as a brute fact repugnant to reason, (in which case neither the PNC nor the PSR holds).
From this, two conclusions:
First, as the modal cosmological argument, or argument from contingency, is just the principle of efficient causality, it is based on just the PSR [1] and does not require the aristotelical framework of act and potency. This is an important result, because otherwise St Paul's statement that "since the creation of the world God's invisible attributes, his eternal power and divine nature, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made" (Rom 1:20) would need to be restated as "since Aristotle wrote his Metaphysics God's invisible attributes, his eternal power and divine nature, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made".
Second, it seems that the teaching in First Vatican Council's Constitution Dei Filius "that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things;" as well as the above Pauline statement that Dei Filius quotes right next as basis for that teaching, presupposes the implicit condition "if the person in question assumes that reality is ultimately intelligible/explainable by human reason". [2]
Thus, the issue of theism vs atheism (agnosticism) would not be really philosophical but meta-philosophical, as the latter positions would be based on the assumption that reality as a whole is not (necessarily) rationally intelligible/explainable.
Which is exactly David Hume's position as summarized by Texas A&M University Prof. of Philosophy Stephen H. Daniel [3]:
"The argument assumes that the world's existence can be explained rationally by appeal to God as its cause; but why should we think that the world's existence is rationally explainable?"
And which is the basis of the "Thesis 1" that I propose on the next article.
References
[1] That PSR is sufficient for PC was confirmed by Prof. Edward Feser in an article he published in his blog on 2014 09 06:
a Scholastic might (as some Neo-Scholastic writers did) argue for PC on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
[I]f PC were false — if the actualization of a potency, the existence of a contingent thing, or something’s changing or coming into being could lack a cause — then these phenomena would not be intelligible, would lack a sufficient reason or adequate explanation. Hence if PSR is true, PC must be true.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/09/marmodoro-on-psr-and-pc.html
[2] That PSR is necessary for PC was confirmed by Prof. Edward Feser in an article he published in his blog on 2014 11 02:
"Now if PSR is false, then the principle of causality is threatened as well, since if things are ultimately unintelligible, there is no reason to think that a potency might not be actualized even though there is nothing actual to actualize it and thus that something contingent, like the universe, might just be without any cause at all. But then it would not be possible to argue from the world to God as cause of the world."
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/voluntarism-and-psr.html
[3] Test Questions for Phil 251: Intro. to Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, option 101.B
(where options 99 and 101 should say "cosmological", not "teleological", argument).
http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/quesrel.html
Sola scriptura is against Scripture, specifically four Pauline passages
First, not everything which was revealed by God was transmitted in writing by the Apostles, at least definitively not by Paul:
"So then, brothers, stand firm and hold to the traditions that you were taught by us, either by our spoken word or by our letter." (2 Thess 2:15)
"Follow the pattern of the sound words that you have heard from me, in the faith and love that are in Christ Jesus." (2 Tim 1:13)
"and what you have heard from me in the presence of many witnesses entrust to faithful men who will be able to teach others also." (2 Tim 2:2)
The objection to sola scriptura from the three above passages could be ingeniously countered by positing that any knowledge that Paul transmitted only orally and which needed to be transmitted to future generations was put in writing by some other NT author, be it John, Peter, James, Jude, or Luke in Acts. I don't think any sola scriptura defender would actually resort to such convoluted argument, but even if they did, they'd still need to explain away this other passage from Paul:
"the Church of the living God, the pillar and support of the truth." (1 Tim 3:15)
In this passage, "support", rendered alternatively as "foundation", "bulwark" or "buttress", translates "hedraióma", a word used only once in the NT and nowhere else. To note, the usual word for "foundation" is "themelios", used in several places by Paul to refer to:
- Jesus Christ (1 Cor 3:10-12),
- the apostles and prophets (Eph 2:20), "Christ Jesus Himself being the cornerstone (akrogóniaios)" in this case, and
- those who belong to God, i.e. the Church: "God's firm foundation stands, bearing this seal: "The Lord knows those who are his,"" (2 Tim 2:19).
The relationship between Jesus, the apostles and the whole of the Church in these passages with "foundation"/"themelios" mirrors the relationship between Jesus, Peter and the totality of the faithful in four passages with "rock" or "stone", namely those where:
- Paul and Peter call Jesus "the cornerstone", i.e. Eph 2:20 and 1 Pe 2:6-7 respectively, the latter using both "akrogóniaios" and "kephale gonias",
- Jesus tells Simon: "you are Rock (Kepha/Petros), and upon this rock (kepha/petra) I will build my church" (Mt 16:18), and
- Peter says that the faithful "as living stones, are being built up as a spiritual house" (1 Pe 2:5).
The teaching from either set of passages is clear:
- Jesus is the ultimate foundation, the cornerstone, and it is so by Himself, by nature.
- Peter and the apostles are foundation by the grace of Christ, by participation in his firmness.
- The whole Church, "built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets" (Eph 2:20), is also foundation and support by participation.
The point is that it is the Church which is "the pillar and support of the truth", not Scripture. This statement, together with the quoted Pauline exhortations to hold to the traditions received orally from him, show clearly that the position of sola scriptura is against Scripture.
"So then, brothers, stand firm and hold to the traditions that you were taught by us, either by our spoken word or by our letter." (2 Thess 2:15)
"Follow the pattern of the sound words that you have heard from me, in the faith and love that are in Christ Jesus." (2 Tim 1:13)
"and what you have heard from me in the presence of many witnesses entrust to faithful men who will be able to teach others also." (2 Tim 2:2)
The objection to sola scriptura from the three above passages could be ingeniously countered by positing that any knowledge that Paul transmitted only orally and which needed to be transmitted to future generations was put in writing by some other NT author, be it John, Peter, James, Jude, or Luke in Acts. I don't think any sola scriptura defender would actually resort to such convoluted argument, but even if they did, they'd still need to explain away this other passage from Paul:
"the Church of the living God, the pillar and support of the truth." (1 Tim 3:15)
In this passage, "support", rendered alternatively as "foundation", "bulwark" or "buttress", translates "hedraióma", a word used only once in the NT and nowhere else. To note, the usual word for "foundation" is "themelios", used in several places by Paul to refer to:
- Jesus Christ (1 Cor 3:10-12),
- the apostles and prophets (Eph 2:20), "Christ Jesus Himself being the cornerstone (akrogóniaios)" in this case, and
- those who belong to God, i.e. the Church: "God's firm foundation stands, bearing this seal: "The Lord knows those who are his,"" (2 Tim 2:19).
The relationship between Jesus, the apostles and the whole of the Church in these passages with "foundation"/"themelios" mirrors the relationship between Jesus, Peter and the totality of the faithful in four passages with "rock" or "stone", namely those where:
- Paul and Peter call Jesus "the cornerstone", i.e. Eph 2:20 and 1 Pe 2:6-7 respectively, the latter using both "akrogóniaios" and "kephale gonias",
- Jesus tells Simon: "you are Rock (Kepha/Petros), and upon this rock (kepha/petra) I will build my church" (Mt 16:18), and
- Peter says that the faithful "as living stones, are being built up as a spiritual house" (1 Pe 2:5).
The teaching from either set of passages is clear:
- Jesus is the ultimate foundation, the cornerstone, and it is so by Himself, by nature.
- Peter and the apostles are foundation by the grace of Christ, by participation in his firmness.
- The whole Church, "built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets" (Eph 2:20), is also foundation and support by participation.
The point is that it is the Church which is "the pillar and support of the truth", not Scripture. This statement, together with the quoted Pauline exhortations to hold to the traditions received orally from him, show clearly that the position of sola scriptura is against Scripture.
25 May 2015
Sustitución de obediencia en la expiación realizada por Jesús
Es bien conocido que las distintas confesiones cristianas entienden de manera distinta la forma en que la expiación de los pecados realizada por Jesucristo es aplicada a los creyentes, tanto respecto a cómo los creyentes acceden al fruto de esta expiación, la justificación, como respecto a en qué consiste la justificación de esos creyentes. El tratamiento de estos temas, así como las polémicas sobre ellos entre fieles de distintas confesiones, es frecuente.
En contraste, el tema de en qué consistió la expiación de los pecados realizada por Jesucristo es tratado mucho menos frecuentemente, a pesar de que es entendido de manera distinta no solamente por las distintas denominaciones cristianas, sino incluso por distintos fieles de una misma denominación. En el caso particular de los católicos, esta diversidad de entendimiento puede ocurrir porque la doctrina oficial de la Iglesia Católica sobre este tema particular es muy escueta, y consiste solamente en la definición, por el Concilio de Trento, de que Jesús "nos mereció con su santísima pasión en el árbol de la cruz la justificación, y satisfizo por nosotros a Dios Padre."
El punto es: ¿en qué consistió ese "satisfacer por nosotros" a Dios Padre? En principio hay dos respuestas posibles:
A. Sustitución de obediencia:
La obediencia de Jesús sustituyó la que debíamos haber prestado (y no habíamos prestado): reparación de la raíz del mal.
B. Sustitución de pena o sustitución penal:
Los padecimientos de Jesús sustituyeron los que debíamos sufrir por no haber obedecido (y no sufriremos): reparación de la consecuencia del mal.
Discernir entre estas posiciones no es fácil porque ambas cuentan con pasajes bíblicos que las apoyan o parecen apoyarlas. Así, en apoyo de la posición A podemos citar:
"En efecto, así como por la desobediencia de un solo hombre todos fueron constituidos pecadores, así también por la obediencia de uno solo todos serán constituidos justos." (Rom 5:19)
Mientras que en apoyo de la posición B podemos citar:
"por sus llagas hemos sido curados." (Is 53:5, citado por 1 Pe 2:24)
Estudiando primero la posición A, ¿cómo se interpretan en ella los pasajes que afirman, o parecen afirmar, que somos justificados por el sufrimiento de Jesús? Para responder esta pregunta es necesario entender en qué consistió la obediencia de Jesús al Padre, o sea qué fue lo que el Padre ordenó a Jesús que hiciera. Simplemente, el mandato del Padre a Jesús fue que permitiese que la dirigencia religiosa judía, y luego las autoridades romanas a instancias de ella, lo apresaran, golpearan, flagelaran, coronaran de espinas y crucificaran, eventos que, dada la actitud hacia Jesús por parte de la dirigencia religiosa judía, eran inevitables si Jesús no usaba su poder divino para defenderse. Este mandato iba más allá del cumplimiento de los 10 mandamientos y de la Ley de Moisés a los que Jesús, como hombre y como israelita, estaba obligado. Porque de acuerdo a los 10 mandamientos y a la Ley de Moisés, Jesús tenía el derecho de defenderse de quienes injustamente pretendían atentar contra su integridad física, y tenía obviamente el poder para hacerlo. El mandato del Padre a Jesús fue justamente que no hiciera uso de su derecho y poder de defenderse, que permitiese que lo maltrataran y mataran. Esto lo dice Jesús explícitamente:
"«Por eso me ama el Padre, porque doy mi vida, para recobrarla de nuevo. Nadie me la quita; yo la doy voluntariamente. Tengo poder para darla y poder para recobrarla de nuevo; esa es la orden que he recibido de mi Padre.»" (Jn 10:17-18)
La orden del Padre a Jesús es que dé voluntariamente su vida, o sea que permita voluntariamente que lo maten, que no haga uso de su derecho y poder para evitarlo.
Es claro que, en las circunstancias en que Jesús ejercía su ministerio, obedecer a la orden del Padre tenía como consecuencia necesaria su sufrimiento y su muerte. La obediencia de Jesús a la orden del Padre era necesariamente una obediencia "hasta la muerte, y muerte de cruz" (Fil 2:8). Pero en la posición A, lo que quiso el Padre, lo que agradó infinitamente al Padre, lo que satisfizo al Padre por nuestros pecados, es la obediencia de Jesús hasta el sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte, no su sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte en sí mismos. En la posición A, los pasajes de la Biblia que parecen afirmar que somos justificados por el sufrimiento de Jesús, se refieren al sufrimiento de Jesús como consecuencia necesaria de su obediencia. El precio de nuestra justificación fue la obediencia de Jesús al Padre, y el precio de esta obediencia fue su sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte.
Resumiendo, tanto la obediencia como el sufrimiento tienen un rol importante en ambas posiciones. La clave es cuál de ellos tiene el rol primario. Así:
En la posición A, lo que satisfizo a Dios Padre fue la obediencia de Jesús, y su sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte fueron una consecuencia necesaria de su obediencia que hizo que ésta fuese heroica.
En la posición B, lo que satisfizo a Dios Padre fue el sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte de Jesús, y su obediencia fue un requisito necesario para que su sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte fuesen aceptables a Dios.
¿Por qué es importante discernir entre ambas posiciones? Porque si lo que satisfizo a Dios fue la obediencia por amor, o el amor obediente, de Jesús, entonces Dios es Amor como dice San Juan en su primera carta, mientras que si lo que satisfizo a Dios fue el sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte de Jesús en sí mismos, entonces Dios es como una divinidad azteca sedienta de sangre, excepto que es único y todopoderoso.
Hasta aquí he mostrado solamente que la posición A es plausible, pero no que su fundamento bíblico es decididamente superior al de la posición B. Para ello, partiendo de la noción de la muerte de Jesús como sacrificio a Dios en expiación por nuestros pecados, y de que este sacrificio fue prefigurado por los sacrificios del Antiguo Testamento, estudiaré qué era lo que agradaba a Dios en éstos.
La noción de la muerte de Jesús como sacrificio a Dios en expiación por nuestros pecados es mencionada en primer lugar en el cuarto poema del Siervo de Yahveh en Isaías cap. 53:
"Si se da a sí mismo en expiación, verá descendencia, alargará sus días, y lo que plazca a Yahveh se cumplirá por su mano." (Is 53:10)
La figura del sacrificio de expiación de Levítico cap. 16 es usada por San Pablo en relación a los dos machos cabríos ofrecidos en dicho sacrificio. En primer lugar, el macho cabrío que era degollado y con cuya sangre se aspergía el propiciatorio que estaba sobre el arca de la alianza (Lev 16:15-16):
"en virtud de la redención realizada en Cristo Jesús, a quien exhibió Dios como instrumento de propiciación por su propia sangre," (Rom 3:24-25)
En segundo lugar, el macho cabrío sobre el cual se echaban "todas las culpas, todas las iniquidades de los hijos de Israel" y que era mandado al desierto (Lev 16:21-22):
"A quien no conoció pecado, le hizo pecado por nosotros, para que viniésemos a ser justicia de Dios en él." (2 Cor 5:21)
San Juan, por su parte, usa repetidamente la figura del cordero pascual inmolado a la tarde del 14 de Nisán (Abib en el Pentateuco) y con cuya sangre los israelitas untaron los postes y el dintel de sus casas en Egipto (Ex 12:3-13). De hecho, a diferencia de los sinópticos, que ubican la crucifixión de Jesús en el día de Pascua, 15 de Nisán, Juan la ubica en la Víspera (Parasceve) de la Pascua (Jn 18:28, 19:14), o sea el 14 de Nisán, de modo que la muerte de Jesús ocurrió en el mismo momento en que los corderos pascuales eran inmolados en el Templo. Notablemente, la datación de Juan es respaldada por los cálculos contemporáneos de las fases de la luna en esos años, según los cuales el 14 de Nisán fue viernes los años 30 y 33, mientras que el 15 de Nisán no fue viernes en ningún posible año de la Pascua de Jesús.
La figura del cordero inmolado es usada también por San Pedro en su carta:
"habéis sido rescatados de la conducta necia heredada de vuestros padres, no con algo caduco, oro o plata, sino con una sangre preciosa, como de cordero sin tacha y sin mancilla, Cristo," (1 Pe 1:18-19)
Finalmente, la Carta a los Hebreos en sus primeros 10 capítulos desarrolla extensamente la noción del sacrificio de Jesús, en el cual Él es al mismo tiempo sacerdote y víctima. Cito solamente un pasaje:
"¡cuánto más la sangre de Cristo, que por el Espíritu Eterno se ofreció a sí mismo sin tacha a Dios, purificará de las obras muertas nuestra conciencia para rendir culto a Dios vivo!" (Heb 9:14)
Todos estos pasajes parecen afirmar que lo que agradó a Dios Padre fue el sufrimiento, la sangre y la muerte de Cristo. Hebreos incluso afirma en otro pasaje que Dios "perfeccionó" a Cristo (obviamente como hombre) mediante los sufrimientos:
"Convenía, en verdad, que Aquel por quien es todo y para quien es todo, llevara muchos hijos a la gloria, perfeccionando mediante los sufrimientos al que iba a guiarlos a la salvación." (Heb 2:10)
Ahora bien, ¿lo que perfeccionó a Cristo fueron los sufrimientos en sí mismos, o en tanto estaban asociados a algo más importante? Otro pasaje responde esto:
"y aun siendo Hijo, aprendió por sus padecimientos la obediencia; y llegado a la perfección, se convirtió en causa de salvación eterna para todos los que le obedecen," (Heb 5:8)
O sea que lo que perfeccionó a Cristo (como hombre) fue su obediencia al Padre, obediencia en grado heroico por estar unida al sufrimiento, y no el sufrimiento en sí mismo. Volviendo a la cuestión de qué fue lo que agradó al Padre en el sacrificio de Cristo, examinemos qué era lo que agradaba a Dios en los sacrificios del Antiguo Testamento, dado que estos sacrificios prefiguraban el de Jesús. La respuesta está muy clara en dos pasajes:
"Pero Samuel dijo: «¿Se complace Yahveh en holocaustos y sacrificios tanto como en obedecer la voz de Yahveh? Mirad, obedecer es mejor que sacrificar, escuchar es mejor que la grasa de los carneros.»" (1 Sam 15:22)
"Porque Yo me complazco en amor fiel (*) antes que sacrificio, en el conocimiento de Dios antes que holocaustos." (Os 6:6)
(*) “amor fiel” es la traducción de “chesed” o “hesed”, que significa amor asociado tanto con fidelidad como con compasión o misericordia. El cual fue vivido perfectamente por Jesús en sus dos dimensiones: amor obediente y fiel a Dios Padre, y en ese amor, amor compasivo y misericordioso a nosotros.
Obviamente no hay contradicción entre que Dios se complazca en la obediencia a su voz y que se complazca en el amor fiel, porque nuestro amor a Dios debe necesariamente ser un amor obediente, y por otra parte nuestra obediencia a Dios es perfecta cuando no es por miedo al castigo sino por amor a El, a partir del conocimiento de que El es infinitamente poderoso, sabio y bueno, tal que, porque es infinitamente bueno quiere el mayor bien para nosotros, porque es infinitamente sabio sabe perfectamente qué conviene que hagamos nosotros para alcanzar nuestro mayor bien, y porque es infinitamente poderoso puede hacer El lo que sea necesario para que alcancemos nuestro mayor bien. La perfecta obediencia a Dios se basa en el amor a El, y el amor a Dios se basa en el conocimiento de El. Lo cual nos recuerda otro pasaje del cuarto canto del Servidor: "Por su conocimiento justificará mi Siervo a muchos y las culpas de ellos él soportará." (Is 53:11)
Por lo tanto, lo que agradaba a Dios en los sacrificios del Antiguo Testamento no era el sufrimiento, la sangre, y la muerte de la víctima en sí mismos, sino la obediencia por amor, o el amor obediente, de quien ofrecía el sacrificio, lo cual es particularmente evidente en el episodio en que Abraham obedece el mandato divino de ofrecerle a Isaac en sacrificio. El Dios verdadero no es una divinidad azteca sedienta de sangre, sino que es Amor como enseña San Juan en su primera carta, y quiere una respuesta de amor, amor necesariamente obediente, de parte de sus creaturas. Queda así claro qué fue lo que agradó a Dios Padre en el sacrificio de Cristo: no su sufrimiento, derramamiento de sangre y muerte en sí mismos, sino su amor obediente, o su obediencia por amor, "hasta la muerte, y muerte de cruz" (Fil 2:8).
A mi juicio esta posición está de acuerdo con lo que dice el Catecismo en los puntos 603, 609, 614, 615 y 616, del último de los cuales cito: "El «amor hasta el extremo» (Jn 13:1) es el que confiere su valor de redención y de reparación, de expiación y de satisfacción al sacrificio de Cristo."
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Addendum de 2015 09 19
La posición A, sustitución de obediencia, está en línea con la de dos doctores de la Iglesia del siglo XIII: S. Tomás de Aquino y S. Buenaventura de Bagnoregio, máximos exponentes de las dos grandes escuelas teológicas dentro del catolicismo, la dominicana y la franciscana respectivamente. Cito de:
Rik van Niewenhove "Late Mediaeval Anotement Theologies", ch. 16 in Francesca Aran Murphy ed. 2015 "The Oxford Handbook of Christology", pp. 250-264.
https://books.google.com/books?id=YssRCgAAQBAJ
Para S. Buenaventura (p. 253):
the source of merit of Christ's atoning work is not suffering itself but his love and obedience which find expression in that suffering (III Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 3).
la fuente del mérito del trabajo expiatorio de Cristo no es el sufrimiento en sí mismo sino su amor y obediencia que hallan expresión en ese sufrimiento (III Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 3).
Para S. Tomás (p. 255):
the sufferings of Christ are not the primary source of our salvation, but rather what they denote ('invisibly'), namely his love and obedience to the Father (ST III, q. 47, a. 2; ST III, q. 47, a. 4, ad 2).
los sufrimientos de Cristo no son la fuente primaria de nuestra salvación, sino lo que ellos denotan ('invisiblemente'), esto es su amor y obediencia al Padre (ST III, q. 47, a. 2; ST III, q. 47, a. 4, ad 2).
(Reestructuré la cita a ST III en el libro porque todo el art. 2 de la q. 47 es relevante, y no solamente la respuesta a la objeción 3.)
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Summary in English
Since Old Testament sacrifices were prefigurations of Jesus’ sacrifice, it is useful to consider what in them pleased God. Was it the suffering, blood and death of the victim in themselves? Or was the obedience and love of the offerer? In other words, was YHWH acting like an Aztec blood-thirsty god, or was He acting as Love as the Apostle John defines Him in his 1st letter?
The answer is in these two passages, which are essential for understanding what pleased God in OT sacrifices, and therefore in Jesus’:
"And Samuel said, «Has the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to listen than the fat of rams.»" (1 Sam 15:22)
"For I delight in steadfast love (*) rather than sacrifice, and in the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings." (Hos 6:6)
(*) “steadfast love” is the translation of “chesed” or “hesed”, which means love associated with both loyalty and kindness. Which was lived perfectly by Jesus in its two dimensions: loyal love to the Father, and in that love, kind, merciful love to us.
So what pleased God was obedience and love, not the suffering and death of the victim “per se”. Which should make clear what the central component in Jesus’ sacrifice was, what was in it that pleased the Father infinitely and atoned for our faults: not his suffering, pouring of blood and death “per se”, but his obedient love to the Father “to the point of death, even death on a cross.” (Phil 2:8)
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